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Abstract
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typ-
ically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source
for such a distribution is past data. The goal of this paper is to understand how much data
is necessary and sufficient to guarantee near-optimal expected revenue.
Our basic model is a single-item auction in which bidders’ valuations are drawn indepen-
dently from unknown and non-identical distributions. The seller is given m samples from
each of these distributions “for free” and chooses an auction to run on a fresh sample. How
large does m need to be, as a function of the number k of bidders and  > 0, so that a
(1− )-approximation of the optimal revenue is achievable?
We prove that, under standard tail conditions on the underlying distributions, m =
poly(k, 1 ) samples are necessary and sufficient. Our lower bound stands in contrast to
many recent results on simple and prior-independent auctions and fundamentally involves
the interplay between bidder competition, non-identical distributions, and a very close (but
still constant) approximation of the optimal revenue. It effectively shows that the only way
to achieve a sufficiently good constant approximation of the optimal revenue is through a
detailed understanding of bidders’ valuation distributions. Our upper bound is constructive
and applies in particular to a variant of the empirical Myerson auction, the natural auction
that runs the revenue-maximizing auction with respect to the empirical distributions of the
samples.
Our sample complexity lower bound depends on the set of allowable distributions, and
to capture this we introduce α-strongly regular distributions, which interpolate between the
well-studied classes of regular (α = 0) and MHR (α = 1) distributions. We give evidence
that this definition is of independent interest.
1 Introduction
Comparing the revenue of two different auctions requires an analysis framework for trading off
performance on different inputs. For instance, in a single-item auction, a second-price auction
with a reserve price r > 0 will earn more revenue than a second-price auction with no reserve
price on some inputs, and less on others. Which auction is better?
The conventional approach in auction theory is Bayesian, or average-case, analysis. That
is, bidders’ valuations are assumed to be drawn from a distribution, and one auction is defined
to be better than another if it has higher expected revenue with respect to this distribution.
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The optimal auction is then the one with the highest expected revenue. The optimal auction
depends on the assumed distribution, in some cases in a detailed way.
While there is now a significant body of work on worst-case revenue maximization (see [25]),
a majority of modern computer science research on revenue-maximizing auctions uses Bayesian
analysis to measure auction performance (see [24]). Since the comparison between auctions
depends fundamentally on the assumed distribution, an obvious question is: where does this
prior distribution come from, anyway?
In most applications, and especially in computer science contexts, the answer is equally
obvious: from past data. For example, in Yahoo!’s keyword auctions, Bayesian analysis was
used to provide guidance on how to set per-click reserve prices, and the valuation distributions
used in this analysis are derived straightforwardly from bid data from the recent past [35]. This
is a natural approach, but how well does it work?
1.1 The Model
The goal of this paper is to understand how much data is necessary and sufficient to guarantee
near-optimal expected revenue. Our model is the following. There are k bidders in a single-item
auction. The valuation (i.e., willingness-to-pay) of bidder i is a sample from a distribution Fi.
The Fi’s are independent but not necessarily identical.
The distribution F = F1×· · ·×Fk is unknown to the seller. The “data” comes in the form of
m independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples v(1), . . . ,v(m) from F — equivalently,
m i.i.d. samples from each of the k individual distributions F1, . . . , Fk. The seller observes the
samples and then commits to a truthful auction A.1 We call this function from samples to
auctions an m-sample auction strategy. The seller then earns the revenue of its chosen auction
A on the “real” input, a fresh independent sample v(m+1) from F. See also Figure 1. We can
state our main question as follows.
(*) How many samples m are necessary and sufficient for the existence of an m-sample auction
strategy that, for every distribution F in some class D, has expected revenue at least (1−)
times that of the optimal auction for F?
The expected revenue of an auction strategy is with respect to both the samples v(1), . . . ,v(m)
and the input v(m+1) — i.e., over m + 1 i.i.d. samples from F. The expected revenue of an
optimal auction is with respect to a single sample (the input) from F. Our formalism is inspired
by computational learning theory [38].
The answer to the question (*) could be a function of up to three different parameters:
the error tolerance , the number k of bidders, and the set D of allowable distributions2. It is
clear that some restriction on D is necessary for the question (*) to be interesting: without any
restriction, no finite number of samples is sufficient to guarantee near-optimal revenue, even
when there is only one bidder.3
1An auction is truthful if truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for every bidder. That is: for every bidder i,
and all possible bids by the other bidders, i maximizes its expected utility (value minus price paid) by bidding
its true value. For single-item auctions, the optimal expected revenue of any (possibly non-truthful) auction,
measured at a Bayes-Nash equilibrium with respect to the prior distribution, is no larger than that of the optimal
truthful auction. Also, the restriction to dominant strategies is natural given our assumption of an unknown
distribution.
2As the distribution F is unknown, we seek uniform sample complexity bounds, meaning bounds that depend
only on D and not on F.
3To see this, consider all distributions that take on a value M2 with probability 1
M
and 0 with probability
1− 1
M
. The optimal auction for such a distribution earns expected revenue M . It is not difficult to prove that,
for every m, there is no m-sample auction strategy with near-optimal revenue for every such distribution —
for sufficiently large M , all m samples are 0 with high probability and the auction strategy has to resort to an
uneducated guess for M .
2
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Figure 1: A single-item auction A is chosen as a function of s i.i.d. samples v1, . . . ,vs from an
unknown distribution F1 × · · · × Fn, and applied to a fresh sample vs+1 from the same distri-
bution. The benchmark is the expected revenue of the Myerson-optimal auction for F1, . . . , Fn.
Our model can be viewed as an interpolation between worst-case and average-case analysis.
It inherits much of the robustness of the worst-case model, since we demand guarantees for
every underlying F , while allowing very good approximation guarantees with respect to a strong
benchmark.
1.2 Distributional Assumptions
Two distributional assumptions that have been extensively used (see e.g. [24]) are the regularity
and monotone hazard rate (MHR) conditions. The former asserts that the “virtual valuation”
function vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) is nondecreasing, where fi is the density of Fi, while the second imposes
the strictly stronger condition that fi(vi)1−Fi(vi) is nondecreasing. The “most tail-heavy” regular
distribution has the distribution function Fi(vi) = 1 − 1vi+1 , while the most tail-heavy MHR
distributions are the exponential distributions.
Our lower bound on the sample complexity of revenue maximization depends on the set
of allowable distributions, and to capture this we introduce a parameterized condition that
interpolates between the regularity and MHR conditions; this condition is also useful in other
contexts (see Section 4).
Definition 1.1. (α-Strongly Regular Distribution) Let F be a distribution with positive
density function f on its support [a, b], where 0 ≤ a <∞ and a ≤ b ≤ ∞. Let ϕ(v) = v− 1−F (v)f(v)
denote the corresponding virtual valuation function. F is α-strongly regular if
ϕ(y)− ϕ(x) ≥ α(y − x) (1)
whenever y > x ≥ 0.
For distributions with a differentiable virtual valuation function ϕ, condition (1) is equiv-
alent to dϕdv ≥ α. Regular and MHR distributions are precisely the 0- and 1-strongly regular
distributions, respectively. A product distribution F = F1×· · ·×Fk is called α-strongly regular
if each Fi is α-strongly regular. For the lower bound, we take the set D of allowable distributions
in (*) to be the α-strongly regular distributions for a parameter α ∈ [0, 1].
1.3 Our Results
Our main result is that m = poly(k, 1 ) samples are necessary and sufficient for the existence
of an m-sample auction strategy that, for every strongly regular distribution F, has expected
revenue at least (1− ) times that of an optimal auction.
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Both our upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity of revenue maximization are
significant. For the lower bound, it is far from obvious that the number of samples per bidder
needs to depend on k at all, let alone polynomially. Indeed, for many relaxations of the problem
we study, the sample complexity is a function of  only.
• If there is an unlimited supply of items (digital goods), then the problem reduces to sepa-
rate single-bidder problems, for which poly(1 ) samples suffice for a (1− )-approximation
for all regular distributions [18, Lemma 4.1].
• If bidder valuations are independent and identical draws from an unknown regular distri-
bution, then poly(1 ) samples suffice for a (1− )-approximation [18, Theorem 4.3].
• If only a 14 -approximation of the optimal expected revenue is required, then only a single
sample is required. This follows from a generalization of the Bulow-Klemperer theorem [7]
to non-i.i.d. bidders [26, Theorem 4.4].
Thus, the necessary dependence on k fundamentally involves the interplay between bidder
competition, non-identical distributions, and a very close (but still constant) approximation of
the optimal revenue.
On a conceptual level, our lower bound shows that designing c-approximate auctions for
constants c sufficiently close to 1 is a qualitatively different problem than for more modest
constants like 14 . For example, previous work has demonstrated that auctions with reasonably
good approximation factors are possible with minimal dependence on the valuation distributions
(e.g. [9, 26, 2]) or even, when there is no bidder with a unique valuation distribution, with no
dependence on the valuation distributions [17, 18, 36]. Another interpretation of some previous
results, such as [11, 9], is the existence of constant-factor approximate auctions that derive
no benefit from bidder competition. Our lower bound identifies, for the first time, a constant
approximation threshold beyond which “robustness” and “prior-independence” results of these
types cannot extend. Our argument formalizes the idea that, with two or more non-identical
bidders, the only way to achieve a sufficiently good constant approximation of the optimal
revenue is through a detailed understanding of bidders’ valuation distributions and an essentially
optimal resolution of bidder competition.
We provide an upper bound on the number of samples needed for near-optimal approxima-
tion by analyzing a natural auction strategy. Recall that for a distribution F that is known a
priori, Myerson’s optimal auction gives the item to the bidder with the highest virtual valua-
tion ϕi(vi) = vi− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , or to no one if all virtual valuations are negative [33]. The empirical
Myerson auction is the obvious analog when one has data rather than distributional knowledge:
define F¯i as the empirical distribution of the samples from Fi, and run the optimal auction for
F¯.4 We prove that a variant on the empirical Myerson auction has expected revenue at least
(1 − ) times optimal provided it is given a sufficiently large polynomial number of samples.5
A key aspect in our analysis is identifying the (non-pointwise) sense in which empirical virtual
valuation functions approximate the actual virtual valuation functions; this is non-trivial even
for the special case of MHR distributions.
4Since the empirical distributions are generally not regular even when the underlying distributions F are, a
standard extra “ironing” step is required; see Section 2 for details.
5Left unmodified, the empirical Myerson mechanism can be led astray by poor approximations at the upper
end of the valuation distributions caused by a small sample effect. We prove that excluding the very highest
samples from the empirical distributions addresses the problem.
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1.4 Technical Approach
The proofs of our upper and lower bounds are fairly technical, so we provide here an overview of
the main ideas. We begin with the upper bound, which roughly consists of the following steps.
1. (Lemma 6.2) For some fixed bidder with distribution F , consider the corresponding m
samples v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vm. Define the “empirical quantile” q¯j of vj as 2j−12m , the expected
quantile of the jth order statistic. Taking a “net” of quantiles and applying standard
large deviation bounds shows that all but the bottom ξˆ fraction of the empirical quantiles
are good multiplicative approximations of their expectations with high probability; here
ξˆ > 0 is a key parameter that will depend on k and .
2. (Lemma 6.4) Recall that the expected revenue of an auction equals its expected virtual
welfare [33]. Myerson’s optimal auction maximizes virtual welfare pointwise, whereas our
auction maximizes (ironed) empirical virtual welfare pointwise. In a perfect world, we
would be able to argue that the empirical virtual valuation functions are good pointwise
approximations of the true virtual valuation functions, and hence the expected virtual
welfare of our auction is close to that of Myerson’s auction. Unfortunately, good relative
approximation of quantiles does not necessarily translate to good relative approximation
of virtual valuations. The reason is that a virtual valuation function v − 1−F (v)f(v) can
change arbitrarily rapidly in a region where the density changes rapidly (even for MHR
distributions).
We instead prove a different sense in which empirical virtual values approximate actual
virtual values, working in the (quantile) domain as well as in the range of the virtual
valuation functions. Recall that the quantile q(v) is defined as 1−F (v). We show that for
suitable ∆1,∆2 > 0, for all but the top ξˆ fraction of quantiles in [0, 1], with high probability
the empirical virtual value ϕ¯(q) is sandwiched between ϕ(q(1 + ∆1)) and ϕ(q/(1 + ∆2)),
modulo small additive factors. (By ϕ(q) we mean ϕ(F−1(1 − q)).) The additive factors
are functions of 1/q, as well as of k and , which complicates the analysis.
3. (Lemmas 6.8 and 6.9) Consider a fixed bidder i. By the previous step, up to additive
factors, we can lower bound the virtual welfare contributed by a bidder i with a quantile
qi = 1 − Fi(vi) outside the top ξˆ fraction in the empirical Myerson mechanism by the
virtual value contributed by i in the optimal auction when it has a quantile of qi(1 + ∆1).
Or not quite: an additional issue is that the empirical virtual valuation of a different
bidder j with quantile qj might be larger than its true virtual value, leading the empirical
Myerson auction to allocate to j over the rightful winner i, and resulting in a reduction in
the total virtual welfare being accumulated as compared to the actual Myerson auction.
The difference in virtual values is bounded by the additive factors described in (2); as
the outcomes are determined in the empirical auction, we will need two sets of factors:
for bidder i, the factors from the lower sandwiching bound, and for bidder j, the factors
from the upper sandwiching bound. We will show that there is only a small probability of
large additive factors, which suffices to bound the expected reduction in revenue when the
additive factors are large. When the additive factors are small, their contribution to the
reduction in revenue is also small. All the reductions end up being polynomial functions
of k and .
4. (Lemma 6.6 and 6.7) There is one more issue. Because of the shift in quantile space —
we compare the virtual value in the Myerson auction at quantile qi(1 + ∆1) to the virtual
value in the empirical auction at quantile qi — and also because the reserve prices in
the two auctions may differ, we also have to analyze the revenue loss at the lower end of
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the distributions, or more precisely, around the reserve prices. This too is a polynomial
function of k and .
We now discuss the lower bound proof. This involves arguing that, if the number of samples
is too small, then for every auction strategy, there exists a distribution for which the auction
strategy’s expected revenue is not near-optimal. We prove this by exhibiting a “distribution
of distributions” and proving that every auction strategy has expected revenue — where the
expectation is now with respect to both the initial random choice of the valuation distributions,
and then with respect to both the m samples and the input — bounded away from the expected
revenue of an optimal auction (where the expectation is over both the choice of distributions
and the input). We are unaware of any other lower bounds in auction theory that have this
form.
Our construction involves taking a base set of “worst-case” α-strongly regular distributions
and truncating them at random points. A key observation is that, when such a distribution is
truncated at a point Hi, the corresponding virtual valuation function is linear with coefficient
α except at the truncation point, where the virtual valuation jumps to Hi. The high-level
intuition is that, when confronted with valuations that are higher than those seen in any of the
samples, no auction can know whether a high valuation v corresponds to a truncation point
(with virtual value v) or not (with virtual value only α(v−1)). Properly implemented, this idea
can be used to prove that every auction strategy errs with constant probability on precisely the
set of inputs that contribute the lion’s share of the optimal revenue. The lower bound follows.
1.5 Prior and Concurrent Related Work
We provide detailed comparisons only with the papers most closely related to the present work.
For previously studied models about revenue-maximization with an unknown distribution, which
differ in various respects from our model, see [4, 29]. For other uses of samples in auction
design that differ from ours, see Fu et al. [21], who use samples to extend the Cre´mer-McLean
theorem [15] to partially known valuation distributions, and Chawla et al. [10], who design
non-truthful auctions that both have equilibrium revenue within a constant of optimal and
enable accurate inference about the valuation distribution from samples. For other ways to
parameterize partial knowledge about valuations, see e.g. Azar et al. [3] and Chiesa et al. [12].
For asymptotic optimality results in various symmetric settings, which identify conditions under
which the expected revenue of some auction of interest (e.g., second-price) approaches the
optimal with an increasing number of (i.i.d.) bidders, see Neeman [34], Segal [37], Baliga and
Vohra [6], and Goldberg et al. [22]. For applications of learning theory concepts to prior-free
auction design in unlimited-supply settings, see Balcan et al. [5]. Finally, the technical issue
of ironing from samples comes up also in Ha and Hartline [23], in the context of prior-free
mechanism design, and the aforementioned Chawla et al. [10]. Our goal of obtaining a (1− )-
approximation of the maximum revenue achieved by any auction is impossible in the more
demanding settings of [23, 10].
Elkind [20] studies a learning problem closely related to ours, in the restricted setting of
discrete distributions with known finite supports but with unknown probabilities. In the model
in [20], learning is done using an oracle that compares the expected revenue of pairs of auctions,
and O(n2K2) oracles calls suffice to determine the optimal auction (where n is the number of
bidders and K is the support size of the distributions). Elkind [20] notes that such oracle calls
can be implemented approximately by sampling (with high probability), but no specific sample
complexity bounds are stated.
Dhangwatnotai et al. [18], motivated by “prior-independent” auctions that are simultane-
ously approximately optimal for a wide range of valuation distributions, implicitly studied the
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single-bidder version of the learning problem we that study. With one bidder, the goal is to
learn approximately the monopoly price of an unknown distribution from samples. Their results
imply sample complexity upper bounds for this problem of O(−2) and O(−3) for MHR and
regular distributions, respectively.6 As our results show, the learning problem is quite different
and more delicate with multiple non-i.i.d. bidders.
The papers of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [8] and Medina and Mohri [30] give algorithms for learning
the optimal reserve-price-based single-item auction. Our problem of learning the best single-
item auction — whether reserve-based or otherwise — is harder. With non-i.i.d. bidders, there
need not be a reserve price for which the second-price auction has expected revenue more
than 50% times the optimal [26].
Concurrently with our work, Dughmi et al. [19] proved negative results (exponential sample
complexity) for learning near-optimal mechanisms in multi-parameter settings that are much
more complex than the single-item auctions studied here. The paper also contains positive
results for restricted classes of mechanisms.
1.6 Subsequent Related Work
The preliminary version of this paper [13] motivated several follow-up works. Huang et al. [28]
study the single-bidder version of our problem, studied implicitly in [18], and give optimal
sample complexity bounds under several different distributional assumptions. Both the upper
and lower bounds in [28] improve, in terms of the dependence on −1, over those implied by the
present work. This is also the only paper other than the present work that proves any sample
complexity lower bounds.
Morgenstern and Roughgarden [32] adapt tools from statistical learning theory [1] to give
general sample complexity upper bounds that cover all single-parameter settings for bounded
or MHR valuation distributions. The results in [32] apply to many more environments than
single-item auctions, and improve over the sample complexity upper bound of the present work
(even for single-item auctions), but unlike the present work, their results do not apply to regular
distributions and do not result in computationally efficient learning algorithms.
Very recently, Devanur et al. [16] devised a different learning algorithm for our problem
which provides a strict improvement on our upper bound. The sample complexity bound in [16]
is roughly the same as in [32], but the learning algorithm is computationally efficient and also
accommodates regular distributions.
Finally, Cole and Shravas investigated further applications of α-strongly regular distribu-
tions [14].
2 Preliminaries
This section reviews Myerson’s optimal single-item auction [33] for the case of known distri-
butions. There are k bidders, and for each bidder i there is a distribution Fi from which its
valuation is drawn.7
For each buyer i, the auctioneer computes a virtual valuation ϕi(v) = v − [1− Fi(v)]/fi(v),
where fi is the density function corresponding to Fi. ϕi(v) is required to be a non-decreasing
6Similarly, our sample complexity upper bound naturally leads to a prior-independent single-item auction.
This auction achieves a (1 − )-approximation of the optimal auction when bidders’ valuations are drawn from
different regular distributions F1, . . . , Fk and there are sufficiently many bidders of each type.
7Our results extend to the case of k groups of an arbitrary number of bidders, where all the bidders from
group i have i.i.d. valuations drawn from Fi. Then the sample bounds are a function of the number n of bidders,
rather than the number k of groups, but the bound is on the number of samples needed from each group of
bidders.
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function of v. This holds by definition for regular distributions; in general, if this does not
hold ϕi can be modified (or ironed) so that it does hold, as implicitly explained in the next
paragraph. Next, the auctioneer runs an analog of a second-price auction on the virtual values
of the bids (virtual bids for short): the bidder, if any, with the highest non-negative virtual bid
wins the auction (ties are broken arbitrarily) and is charged the minimum bid needed to win
(or at least to tie for winning). More precisely, let i be the winning bidder and let b2 be the
second highest virtual bid. Then the price is ϕi
−1(min{0, b2}). We note that ϕi−1(0) can be
viewed as a bidder-specific reserve price for i; it is also called the monopoly price for i.
We can also describe the auction in terms of a revenue function. This also allows for
situations where ϕi(v) is not a nondecreasing function of v. The revenue function is computed
in quantile space: qi(v) = 1− Fi(v) is the probability that i will have a valuation of at least v.
Now we view v as a function of qi. We introduce the expected revenue function, Ri(qi). It is a
function of the quantile qi: Ri(qi) = v(qi) · qi is the expected revenue if i is the sole bidder and
v(qi) is the price being charged. The auctioneer computes the smallest concave upper bound
CRi(q) of Ri(q). Now ϕi(v(qi)) is defined to be the slope of CRi(qi) (this yields an increasing
function ϕi, which coincides with the previous definition in the case of regular distributions). At
points where there is no unique slope we choose ϕi(v(q)) = lim(q′>q)→q ϕi(v(q′)). The auction
then proceeds as before. Henceforth, overloading notation, we write ϕi(qi) rather than ϕi(v(qi)).
Myerson [33] proved that for every auction, the expected virtual welfare equals the expected
revenue. This result is important because, in many situations, it is much easier to reason about
expected virtual welfare than directly about expected revenue.
Theorem 2.1 (Myerson). The expected revenue of any single-item auction is given by
k∑
i=1
Eqi [ϕi(qi) · xi(qi)],
where xi(qi) is the probability (over others’ valuations and any coin flips by the auction) that i
wins the item with a bid at quantile qi in Fi.
Let q = (q1, q2, . . . , qk) be a vector of quantiles drawn from F1 × F2 × . . . × Fk. We can
rewrite the expected revenue as
k∑
i=1
Eqi [ϕi(qi) · xi(qi)],=
∑
i
∫
q
ϕi(qi)Ii(q) dq, (2)
where Ii(q) is the indicator function showing whether i wins when the bids are at quantiles q
(or more generally, the probability that it wins). This immediately implies that allocating to a
bidder with the highest virtual value, i.e. Myerson’s auction, is optimal.
3 Statement of Main Results
We formally state our upper and lower bound results in turn.
Theorem 3.1. In a single-item auction with k bidders with independent regular valuation dis-
tributions, if m = Ω(k
10
7
ln3 k ), then there is an m-sample auction strategy with expected revenue
at least 1−  times that of an optimal auction.
The auction strategy in Theorem 3.1 is a variant on the “empirical Myerson auction,”
described in detail in Section 6.1.
Our lower bound result has an analogous form, although the polynomial in k and  is
considerably smaller. Our lower bound grows larger as α ≥ 0 grows smaller.
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Theorem 3.2. For every auction strategy Σ, for every k ≥ 2, for every sufficiently small  > 0,
for every α ≥ 0 and m satisfying:
i. α = 1 and m ≤
(
1−ln 2
96e3 min{1, k
e
} ln max{e,k}
)1/2
k√

;
ii. 0 < α < 1, α1/(1−α) ≥ 1k , and m ≤
(
1−α21−α
96e3
)1/(1+α)
k
1/(1+α)
;
iii. 0 < α < 1, 12m < α
1/(1−α) < 1k , and m ≤
(
1−α21−α
96e3
)1/(1+α) (
1
kα1/(1−α)
)α/(1+α)
k
1/(1+α)
;
iv. 0 < α < 1, α1/(1−α) ≤ 12m , and m ≤ (1−α2
1−α)2α
96e3
k
 ;
v. α = 0 and m ≤ 1
96e3
k
 ,
there exists a set F1, . . . , Fk of α-strongly regular valuation distributions such that the expected
revenue of Σ (over the m samples and the input) is less than 1 −  times that of an optimal
auction for F1, . . . , Fk.
At the two extreme points of MHR distributions (α = 1) and regular distributions (α = 0),
the lower bound in Theorem 3.2 is Ω( k√
 ln k
) and Ω(k ), respectively. In all cases, the dependence
on the number of bidders is linear or near-linear.
We prove these two theorems in Sections 6 and 5 respectively. Before that, in the next
section, we briefly indicate two applications of α-strong regularity.
4 Applications of Strong Regularity
We believe our definition of α-strongly regular distributions is of independent interest. Almost
all previous expected revenue approximation guarantees for auctions in Bayesian settings apply
to one of three sets of valuation distributions: all distributions, all regular distributions, or all
MHR distributions (see e.g. [24]). Strongly regular distributions interpolate between regular and
MHR distributions, and should broaden the reach of many existing approximation bounds that
are stated only for MHR distributions. To prove this point, we mention a couple of examples of
such extensions; we are confident that many others are possible, as has been shown subsequently
by Cole and Shravas [14].
The following property of MHR distributions is well known [27, Lemma 4.1].
Lemma 4.1 ([27]). Let F be an MHR distribution with monopoly price r. If q(r) is the quantile
of valuation r in the distribution F , then q(r) ≥ 1e .
We next show how to generalize this result to α-strongly regular distributions.
Lemma 4.2. Let F be an α-strongly regular distribution with α ∈ (0, 1) and monopoly price r.
If q(r) is the quantile of valuation r in the distribution F , then q(r) ≥ α1/(1−α).
Proof. Set λ = 1− α. Let h(·) denote the hazard rate of F , and choose c so that h(r) = 1λr+c .
Recall that ϕ(v) = v − 1h(v) . Since ϕ(r) = 0 and hence h(r) = 1/r, we have c = r(1− λ).
The α-strong-regularity condition, dϕdv ≥ α, implies that 1 + 1h2 dhdv ≥ α, or ddv
(
1
h
) ≤ λ. It
follows that, for all v ≤ r, h(v) ≤ 1λv+c and hence
h(v) ≤ 1
λ(v − r) + r .
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Now write H(x) =
∫ x
0 h(v)dv; it is well known and easy to verify that q(v) = e
−H(v). We
complete the proof by deriving
q(r) = e−H(r) = e−
∫ r
0 h(v)dv
≥ e−[ 1λ log(r+λ(v−r)) |r0 ]
= e
− 1
λ
log r
r(1−λ) = elog(1−λ)
1/λ
= (1− λ)1/λ = α1/(1−α).
Hartline et al. [27, Theorem 4.2] study a revenue maximization problem in social networks,
and give a mechanism with approximation guarantee
1
4− 2e
≈ .306 (3)
when players’ private valuations are drawn from MHR distributions.8 The MHR assumption is
used only in applying Lemma 4.1. Relaxing the distributional assumption to α-strong regularity
and reoptimizing the proof in [27, Theorem 4.2] using Lemma 4.2 extends this approximation
guarantee accordingly, with the term 1/e in (3) replaced by α1/(1−α).
For a second example, Hartline and Roughgarden [26, Theorem 3.2] consider downward-
closed single-parameter environments9 and prove that, when bidders’ valuations are drawn from
MHR distributions, the VCG mechanism with “eager” monopoly reserve prices10 has expected
revenue at least 12 times that of an optimal mechanism. For an α-strongly regular distribution F
with monopoly price r, and v ≥ r, we have ϕ(v) ≥ α(v − r) and hence
r +
1
α
ϕ(v) ≥ v;
this inequality generalizes Lemma 3.1 in [26]. Following the proof in [26, Theorem 3.2] shows
that, for every downward-closed single-parameter environment with bidders valuations drawn
from α-strongly regular distributions, the VCG mechanism with eager monopoly reserves has
expected revenue at least αα+1 times that of an optimal mechanism.
5 The Lower Bound: Proof of Theorem 3.2
Formal Statement Fix α ≥ 0 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, where δ is sufficiently small. We show that for
every auction strategy Σ, there exists a set F1, . . . , Fk of α-strongly regular distributions such
that the expected revenue of the auction strategy (over the samples and the input) is at most
8They also give a 1
4
-approximation algorithm for arbitrary valuation distributions.
9A (binary) single-parameter environment is specified by a set of bidders and the feasible subsets of bidders
that can simultaneously win. For example, if each bidder i wants a known bundle Si of items, then the feasible
subsets are those in which the bundles of the chosen bidders are pairwise disjoint. Such an environment is
downward closed if every subset of a feasible set is again feasible.
10In more detail, one reserve price ri per bidder i is fixed in advance. A bid is collected from each bidder.
Bidders who bid below their reserve prices are removed from further consideration. From the remaining bidders,
the mechanism chooses winners to maximize the sum of their bids, subject to feasibility. The mechanism charges
the unique prices for which losing bidders pay 0 and truthful bidding is a dominant strategy. See [26] for details.
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the following fraction of the expected revenue of the optimal auction for F1, . . . , Fk:
1− (1, δ) = 1− 1− ln 2
96e3 min{1, ke} ln max{e, k}
δ2 for α = 1
1− (α, δ) = 1− 1− α2
1−α
96e3
δ1+α for α < 1 and 1k ≤ α1/(1−α)
1− (α, δ) = 1− 1− α2
1−α
96e3
δ1+α
1
(kα1/(1−α))α
for α < 1 and δ2k < α
1/(1−α) < 1k
1− (α, δ) = 1− 1− α2
1−α
96e3
2αδ for α < 1 and α1/(1−α) ≤ δ2k
1− (α, δ) = 1− 1
96e3
δ for α = 0
We note that if α < 1, then α21−α < 1 also. In addition, for fixed k, limα→0[kα1/(1−α)]α = 1.
Substituting k/m for δ yields the bounds in Theorem 3.2. For 1k ≤ α < 1 and sufficiently small
constant  > 0, Ω(k/1/(1+α)) samples are necessary for a (1− )-approximation. For the MHR
(α = 1) case, Ω(k/
√
 ln k) samples are necessary, and for the regular (α = 0) case, Ω(k/)
samples are needed.
The Base Distributions We identify the worst-case distributions for a given α ≥ 0. Specif-
ically, for v ∈ [0,∞), consider
Fα(v) = 1−
(
1
1 + (1− α)v
) 1
1−α
for 0 ≤ α < 1;
F 1(v) = 1− e−v for α = 1;
fα(v) =
(
1
1 + (1− α)v
)2−α
1−α
for 0 ≤ α < 1;
f1(v) = e−v, for α = 1.
The corresponding hazard rates are
hα(v) =
1
1 + (1− α)v for 0 ≤ α < 1;
h1(v) = 1 for α = 1;
with virtual valuation
ϕα(v) = αv − 1 for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
A quick calculation shows that
(Fα)−1(q) =
 11−α
[(
1
q
)1−α − 1] if 0 ≤ α < 1
ln 1q if α = 1.
(4)
The Construction We define a distribution over distributions. Each bidder i is either type
A or type B (50/50 and independently). For a type B bidder i, we draw q uniformly from the
interval [ δ2k ,
δ
k ] and set Hi = (F
α)−1(1− q). We then define bidder i’s distribution Fi as equal
to Fα on [0, Hi) with a point mass with the remaining probability 1−Fα(Hi) at Hi. For a type
A bidder we proceed similarly except that Hi is set to (F
α)−1(1− δ2k ). These distributions are
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always α-strongly regular. An important point is that the virtual valuation of these bidders is
given by
ϕ(v) =
{
αv − 1 if v < Hi
Hi if v = Hi.
(5)
Ultimately, it is the gap in virtual valuation between these two cases that is responsible for the
lower bound in Theorem 3.2.
A Preliminary Lemma Let qAα denote the monopoly price in an auction with a single type
A bidder. We define qA0 =
δ
2k , as this is the largest quantile q for which ϕ(q) ≥ 0 when α = 0.
For α > 0 we begin by determining the monopoly price qα for F
α. We note that ϕ(v) = 0 when
v = 1α . From (4), we deduce this occurs at qα = α
1/(1−α) for 0 < α < 1, and at q1 = 1e for α = 1.
Thus, for bidder i, for 0 < α < 1, qAα = max{ δ2k , α1/(1−α)}, and for α = 1, qA1 = max{ δ2k , 1e} = 1e
(as we can assume that k ≥ 2, δ ≤ 1).
Let FA,α denote the distribution of a type A bidder. Now let v∗ = (FA,α)−1(max{1 −
qAα ,
k−1
k }), the value corresponding to quantile min{qAα , 1k} in FA,α, and let R∗ = min{kqAα , 1}·v∗,
k times the revenue at this quantile. From (4), we obtain that
v∗ =

1
1−α
[
max
{
1
qAα
, k
}1−α − 1] if 0 ≤ α < 1
ln max
{
1
qAα
, k
}
= ln max{e, k} if α = 1.
(6)
Lemma 5.1. (Upper Bound on Optimal Revenue). The expected revenue (over v) of the
optimal auction (with respect to the Hi’s) is at most R
∗.
Proof. First, the expected revenue of the optimal auction is upper bounded by that of the
optimal auction for the case where all Hi’s are (F
α)−1(1− δ2k ) — i.e., where Fi = FA,α for every
i. Second, by symmetry, when bidders valuations are i.i.d. draws from FA,α, every bidder has
the same purchase probability q in the (symmetric) optimal auction, and since there is only one
item, this purchase probability q is at most 1k ; it is also at most q
A
α . Third, we obtain an upper
bound by dropping the constraint of selling only one item and instead optimally selling to each
bidder with probability q. Fourth, this is precisely k times the revenue of selling to a single
bidder with valuation from FA,α using the posted price (FA,α)−1(1 − q). Fifth, by regularity,
selling to a single bidder with posted price (FA,α)−1(1 − q) with q ≤ min{qAα , 1k} is no better
than selling with posted price v∗ = (FA,α)−1(max{1 − qAα , k−1k }). The expected revenue from
any one bidder is therefore at most the sale probability times v∗, namely min{qAα , 1k} · v∗. The
overall revenue, with k bidders, is thus at most k ×min{qAα , 1k} · v∗ = R∗, as claimed.
Overview of Proof The high-level plan is the following. Fix an arbitrary auction strategy.
Think of the random choices as occurring in three stages: in the first stage, the Fi’s are chosen; in
the second stage, m sample valuation profiles v(1), . . . ,v(m) are chosen (i.i.d. from F1×· · ·×Fk);
in the final stage, the input v is chosen (independently from F1 × · · · × Fk). We prove that
the expected revenue of the auction strategy (with respect to all three stages of randomness)
is at most 1 − (α, δ) times that of the optimal auction (with respect to all three stages or,
equivalently, the first and third stages only).11 Again, 1− (α, δ) < 1 will be independent of k.
This implies that, for every auction strategy, there exists a choice of F1, . . . , Fk such that the
expected revenue of the auction strategy is at most 1 − (α, δ) times the expected revenue of
the optimal auction for the distributions F1, . . . , Fk.
11We prove this statement about the expected virtual welfare, which is equivalent by Theorem 2.1.
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By Lemma 5.1, R∗ is an upper bound on the optimal auction’s expected revenue (equiv-
alently, expected virtual welfare) for every choice of F1, . . . , Fk. The main argument is the
following: there is an event E such that, for every auction strategy:
(i) the probability of E (over all three stages of randomness) is lower bounded by a function
γ(δ) of δ (and independent of k and α);
(ii) given E , the expected virtual welfare of the auction strategy is at least (α, δ)R∗ smaller
than that of the optimal auction, where (α, δ) > 0 is a function of α and δ only.
Since by (2), for each set of bids, the virtual welfare earned by the optimal auction is always
at least that of the auction strategy, (i)–(ii) imply that the expected virtual welfare (and hence
revenue) of the optimal auction exceeds that of the auction strategy by (α, δ)R∗ for some
constant (α, δ) depending on α and δ. Lemma 5.1 then implies that the auction strategy’s
expected revenue is at most 1− (α, δ) times optimal.
The Main Argument To define the event E , we use the principle of deferred decisions. We
can flip the second- and third-stage coins before those of the first stage by sampling quantiles
— (m + 1)k i.i.d. draws {q(j)i } from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. (Once the distributions
are chosen in the first stage, the valuation v
(j)
i is just F
−1
i (1 − q(j)i ).) We further break the
first-stage coin flips into two substages; in the first, we determine bidder types (A and B); in
the second, we choose Hi’s for the type-B bidders. The event E is defined as the set of coin flips
(across all stages) that meet the following criteria:
(P1) There are exactly two quantiles of the form q
(m+1)
i that are at most
δ
k , say of bidders j
and `;
(P2) q
(m+1)
j and q
(m+1)
` are greater than
δ
2k ;
(P3) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, q
(i)
j and q
(i)
` are greater than
δ
k ;
(P4) one of the bidders j, ` is type A, the other is type B (we leave random which is which);
(P5) the type B bidder (from among j, `) has valuation equal to the maximum valuation from
its distribution.
The next lemma corresponds to step (i) in the proof approach above.
Lemma 5.2. The probability of E (over all three stages of randomness) is lower bounded by
δ2
32e3
.
Proof. We first sample the k quantiles corresponding to the third stage. Elementary computa-
tions show that property (P1) holds with probability at least 12eδ
2 (independent of α and k).
Conditioned on (P1) holding, (P2) holds with probability 14 . (P3) is independent of the first
two properties, as it depends only on the second-stage randomness, and it holds with constant
probability of at least 1
e2
(independent of α, k). Proceeding to the first stage, (P4) is indepen-
dent of the first three properties and holds with 50% probability. Conditioned on (P1), (P2),
and (P4) (as (P3) is irrelevant), the probability of (P5) equals the probability that a uniform
draw from [ δ2k ,
δ
k ] (used to determine the H-value) is at least the q-value of the type B bidder,
which is conditionally distributed uniformly on ( δ2k ,
δ
k ]. This happens with probability
1
2 . We
conclude that all of (P1)–(P5) hold with a positive probability, namely
γ(δ) =
δ2
32e3
.
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To work toward statement (ii), we next prove that, for every auction strategy, conditioned
on E , the strategy fails to allocate the item to the optimal bidder — the type-B bidder with
its maximum-possible valuation — with constant probability. It suffices to analyze the auction
strategy that, conditioned on E , maximizes the probability (over the remaining randomness) of
allocating to the optimal bidder — of guessing, from among the two bidders j, ` that in v(m+1)
have valuation at least (Fα)−1(1− δk ), which one is type A and which one is type B. Since the two
bidders were symmetric ex ante, Bayes’ rule implies that the probability of guessing correctly
(given E) is maximized by, for every v(1), . . . ,v(m+1), choosing the scenario that maximizes the
likelihood of the valuation profiles v(1), . . . ,v(m+1) (given E).
Lemma 5.3. Every auction strategy, conditioned on E, allocates to a non-optimal bidder with
probability at least 13 .
Proof. The only valuations that affect the relative likelihoods of the two scenarios are v
(m+1)
j
and v
(m+1)
` . We already know the optimal bidder is either j or `. Property (P3) of event E
implies that the m sample valuations from j and ` are equally likely to be generated under
the two scenarios — the distributions of type-A and type-B bidders differ only for quantiles in
[0, δk ].
Now, given v
(m+1)
j and v
(m+1)
` , the posterior probabilities of the two scenarios are not equal.
The reason is that, conditioned on E , the type-A bidder’s valuation is distributed according
(Fα)−1(q) where q is uniform in [ δ2k ,
δ
k ], while the type-B bidder’s valuation is distributed
according to the smaller of two i.i.d. such samples.12 Thus, assigning the item to the bidder of
j, ` with the lower valuation (in v(m+1)) maximizes the probability of allocating to the optimal
(type-B) bidder. The probability that this allocation rule erroneously allocates the item to the
type-A bidder is the probability that a sample for a distribution (the type-A bidder) is smaller
than the minimum of two other samples from the same distribution (the type-B bidder), which
is precisely 13 .
The following lemma completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 5.4. The revenue of every auction strategy is at most the following fraction of an
optimal auction’s revenue:
1− 1− ln 2
96e3
1
ln max{e, k} min{1,
k
e
}δ2 if α = 1
1− (1− α21−α) 1
96e3
δ1+α if 0 < α < 1 and
1
k
≤ qα = α1/(1−α)
1− (1− α21−α) 1
96e3
δ1+α
1
(kα1/(1−α))α
if 0 < α < 1 and
δ
2k
< qα = α
1/(1−α) <
1
k
1− (1− α21−α) 2
α
96e3
δ if 0 < α < 1 and qα = α
1/(1−α) ≤ δ
2k
1− 1
96e3
δ if α = 0.
12In more detail, consider a type-B bidder i and condition on the event that its quantile qi = 1 − Fi(vi) is
in [ δ
2k
, δ
k
] and that its valuation is its maximum possible, which is equivalent to the condition that its fictitious
quantile q′i that generates its threshold Hi lies in [qi,
δ
k
]. The joint distribution of (qi, q
′
i) is the same as the process
that generates two i.i.d. draws from [ δ
2k
, δ
k
] and assigns qi and q
′
i to the smaller and larger one, respectively. Note
that the valuation of the bidder is, by definition, (Fα)−1(1− q′i).
14
Proof. Condition on the event E . By (5), the virtual value ϕB of the type B bidder i equals
Hi ≥ (Fα)−1( δk ); substituting q = δk in (4) yields a lower bound on Hi which implies that
ϕB ≥
{
1
1−α
[(
k
δ
)1−α − 1] if α < 1
ln kδ if α = 1.
For the type A bidder, by (5), the virtual value ϕA is at most α · (Fα)−1( δ2k ) − 1; using (4)
again, this implies
ϕA ≤
{
α
[
1
1−α
[(
2k
δ
)1−α − 1]]− 1 = α·21−α1−α (kδ )1−α − 11−α if α < 1
ln 2kδ − 1 if α = 1.
Thus, still conditioned on E ,
ϕB − ϕA ≥
{
1
1−α
(
k
δ
)1−α (
1− α · 21−α) if α < 1
1− ln 2 if α = 1.
We now bound the fractional loss of revenue. By Lemma 5.2, E occurs with probability at
least δ2/(32e3). By Lemma 5.3, conditioned on E , a type A rather than a type B bidder is
wrongly allocated the item with probability 13 . Thus the expected loss of revenue is at least
1
3
δ2
32e3
(ϕB − ϕA).
Recall from Lemma 5.1 that the optimal revenue is bounded above by R∗ = k×min{qAα , 1k} ·v∗,
where v∗ = (FA,α)−1(max{1 − qAα , k−1k }) is the value corresponding to quantile min{qAα , 1k} in
FA,α. Recalling (6), we can lower bound the fractional loss of revenue at follows.
If α ∈ [0, 1) and qAα ≥ 1k , then the fractional loss of revenue is at least
δ2
3 · 32e3
ϕB − ϕA
R∗
=
1
3 · 32e3 (1− α2
1−α)
1
1−α
[(
k
δ
)1−α]
δ2
1
1−α(k
1−α − 1) ≥
1− α21−α
96e3
δ1+α.
If α ∈ [0, 1) and qAα ≤ 1k , then the fractional loss of revenue is at least
1
3 · 32e3 (1− α2
1−α)
1
1−α
[(
k
δ
)1−α]
δ2
1
1−αkq
A
α
[(
1
qAα
)1−α − 1] ≥
(1− α21−α) (kδ )1−α δ2
96e3k(qAα )
α
=
(1− α21−α)δ1+α
96e3(qAα k)
α
.
If qAα = α
1/(1−α), this becomes
(1− α21−α)δ1+α
96e3(α1/(1−α)k)α
and if qAα =
δ
2k this simplifies to
2α(1− α21−α)δ
96e3
.
Finally, if α = 1, as qAα =
1
e , the fractional loss of revenue is at least
1− ln 2
96e3 min{1, ke} ln max{e, k}
δ2.
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6 The Upper Bound
Section 6.1 describes in detail the empirical Myerson auction, the auction strategy for which
the guarantee in Theorem 3.1 holds.
6.1 The Empirical Myerson Auction
In the empirical Myerson auction, we assume we are given m independent samples from each
distribution Fi. The gist is to treat the resulting empirical distribution as the actual distribution
in a Myerson auction (Section 2), though some additional technical details are required. In our
variant, a number of the samples with the highest values are discarded, and there is a further
detail regarding how to handle any high bids that occur in the auction (i.e. bids larger than the
largest non-discarded sample).
In detail, for each bidder i, we use the samples from Fi to construct an “empirical revenue
curve” as follows (see also Figure 2):
1. Suppose that the m independent samples drawn from Fi have values vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ . . . ≥ vim.
Define the “empirical quantile” of vij as
2j−1
2m .
2. Discard the bξˆmc − 1 largest samples, for a suitable ξˆ > 0.13 Let S denote the remaining
samples.
3. For each remaining sample vij ∈ S, plot a point (2j−12m , 2j−12m vij).
4. Add points at (0,0) and (1,0).
5. While only needed for the analysis, it will be helpful to define the “empirical revenue
curve”, Ri(q¯): this is the curve comprising straight-line segments joining the sequence of
points specified in Steps 3 and 4 above.
6. Take the convex hull — the least concave upper bound — of this point set. Denote the
resulting “ironed empirical revenue curve” by CRi. This curve has constant slope between
any two consecutive empirical quantiles of points of S.
Now define empirical ironed virtual values as follows. For v > vi,ξˆm, it is simply the value v.
For v ≤ vi,ξˆm, identify the two samples vij , vi(j+1) ∈ S that “sandwich” v. The empirical ironed
virtual value of v is defined as the slope of the revenue curve CRi in the interval defined by the
empirical quantiles of vij and vi(j+1).
14 Note that the empirical ironed virtual value of vi,ξˆm is
also vi,ξˆm, and that the empirical ironed virtual valuation is a nondecreasing function of v.
Finally we run Myerson’s auction on these empirical ironed virtual valuations. That is, the
item is awarded to the bidder, if any, with the highest non-negative virtual value (with ties
broken arbitrarily). The winner’s payment is the lowest bid needed to ensure a (tied) win.
6.2 Notation
We next specify notation so as to clearly distinguish parameters for Myerson’s optimal auction
from those for the empirical auction, as our analysis will be repeatedly comparing these two
auctions. After a couple of simple results, Lemma 6.2 bounds the empirical quantiles as a
13The reason for discarding the largest samples is that if they were present there is a non-negligible probability
that they would create a poor approximation at the high value end of the distribution, which is the end that
matters the most. See also [18].
14If v is one of the points of S and there are multiple choices for this slope, we take the largest one.
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Figure 2: Construction of the ironed empirical revenue curve.
function of the actual quantiles, and vice versa (this is essentially Lemma 4.1 in [18]). Next,
Lemma 6.4 relates the empirical and actual virtual values. With these in hand, in Section 6.5,
we bound the expected revenue loss due to using the empirical auction as opposed to Myerson’s
optimal auction, assuming for the latter auction that the actual distributions were fully known.
Myerson’s Auction Let MR (the “Myerson Revenue”) denote the expected revenue earned
by Myerson’s auction. Let xi(q) denote the probability that bidder i wins in Myerson’s auction
with a bid that has quantile q in its value distribution. Recall that vi(q) denotes the value
corresponding to quantile q and ϕi(q) denotes the virtual value at quantile q. Let MRi =
Eqi [ϕi ·xi] denote the expected revenue provided by i in Myerson’s auction (recall Theorem 2.1).
Let qi(v) denote the minimum quantile for value v; sometimes it will be convenient to let q
i
v
denote qi(v). Let ri be the reserve price applied to i in Myerson’s auction, namely the largest
value for which ϕi(qi(v)) = 0. Let qri denote qi(ri). Let SRi = E[ϕi(q) | q ≥ ri] = qri · ri; note
that SRi is the expected revenue if i were the only participant in Myerson’s auction (SRi is
short for “Single buyer Revenue”). Sometimes, to reduce clutter, we suppress the index i when
it is clear from the context. The following claim is immediate from the definitions.
Claim 6.1. i. MR =
∑n
i=1 MRi.
ii. SRi ≤ MR for all i.
The Empirical Auction The empirical auction is defined in terms of the “empirical quantile”
q¯, but its analysis will entail considering its revenue as a function of the actual quantile q. We
specify notation which will distinguish between these two parameters. For v ≤ vi,ξˆm, we define
the empirical quantile q¯(v) as the solution to v · q = Ri(q) in q. (If there are multiple solutions,
we take the smallest one.) Going the other way, for an empirical quantile q¯ ≥ ξ¯, we define v¯(q¯)
as the solution to v · q¯ = Ri(q¯) in v. The empirical ironed virtual value v¯i(q¯) of an empirical
quantile q¯ ≥ ξ¯ is the slope of CRi at q¯. Let x¯i(q¯) denote the probability that bidder i wins
in the empirical auction with the bid v¯i(q¯). Let ri denote the empirical reserve price, which is
the minimum of v¯i(ξ¯) and the largest value v¯ for which ϕ¯i(q¯i(v¯)) = 0, and let q¯r¯i denote the
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corresponding empirical quantile. Again, to reduce clutter, we sometimes suppress the index i
when it is clear from the context.
The actual quantile q corresponding to empirical quantile q¯ is defined by the relation vi(q) =
v¯i(q¯); it is denoted by q(v¯i(q¯)); we write it as q for short. Finally, we write the empirical
probability of winning as x˜i(q) = x¯i(q¯).
As the auction may draw values vi > v¯i(ξ¯) it is convenient for the purposes of our analysis to
define q¯ for q¯ < ξ¯. Let ξi be defined by vi(ξi) = v¯i(ξ¯). For qi < ξi, we define the corresponding
value of q¯, as q¯(q) = ξ¯ξi q. Then, for q¯ < ξ¯, ϕ¯i(q¯) = vi(q).
6.3 Relating the Actual and Empirical Quantiles
The following result is essentially Lemma 4.1 in [18].
Lemma 6.2. Let F be a regular distribution. Suppose m independent samples with values
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vm are drawn from F . Let γ > 0, ξˆ = am < 1 for some integer a > 0 be given,
and let ν be defined by 1 + ν = (1 + γ)2. Let th =
2h−1
2m . Then, for all v ≤ vξˆm,
q(v) ∈
[
q¯(v)
(1 + γ)2
, q¯(v)(1 + γ)2
]
=
[
q¯(v)
(1 + ν)
, q¯(v)(1 + ν)
]
or equivalently
q¯(v) ∈
[
q(v)
(1 + ν)
, q(v)(1 + ν)
]
with probability at least 1− δ, if γξˆm ≥ 1 and m ≥ 6(1+γ)
γ2ξˆ
max{ ln 3γ , ln 3δ}.
Proof. We begin by identifying a subsequence of the samples, vl1 , vl2 , . . . , vls , with l1 ≤ l2 ≤
. . . ≤ ls; we rename the sequence u1, u2, . . . , us for notational ease. It will be the case that
tli+1 ≤ (1 + γ)tli , for 1 ≤ i < s, and tls(1 + γ) > 1. We will show that
q(vh) ∈
[
th
(1 + γ)
, th(1 + γ)
]
, for vh ∈ U = {u1, . . . , us}.
The claimed bound is then immediate as either each v ≤ vξˆm is sandwiched between two items
in U , or it is at most us.
We define the li as follows: l1 = ξˆm and li+1 = b(1 + γ)lic if b(1 + γ)lic ≤ m, and otherwise
li+1 is not defined (i.e. i = s). As γξˆm ≥ 1, b(1 + γ)ξˆmc ≥ ξˆm + bγξˆmc ≥ l1 + 1, from which
we conclude that the sequence is strictly increasing and hence well defined.
Next we bound the probability that q(ui) > (1 + γ)tli . Now q(ui) > (1 + γ)tli only if fewer
than li = tlim+
1
2 samples have q values that are at most (1 +γ)tli . As the expected number of
such samples is (1+γ)tlim, a Chernoff bound gives the following upper bound on the probability
that q(ui) > (1 + γ)tli (cf. [31]):
exp{− γ
2tlim
2(1 + γ)
}.
Similarly, the probability that q(ui) < tli/(1 + γ) is bounded by
exp{− γ
2tlim
3(1 + γ)
}.
It will be helpful to bound both tl1m and [tli+1 − tli ]m. As ξˆm ≥ 1, tl1m = (2ξˆm− 1)/2 ≥ 12 ξˆm.
And as γξˆm ≥ 1, [tli+1 − tli ]m ≥ b(1 + γ)lic − li ≥ bγlic ≥ bγξˆmc ≥ 12γξˆm.
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Now, by the union bound applied to all the q(ui), we obtain a failure probability of at most:
l∑
i=1
exp{− γ
2tlim
3(1 + γ)
}+ exp{− γ
2tlim
2(1 + γ)
}
≤ 2
l∑
i=1
exp{− γ
2tlim
3(1 + γ)
}
≤ 2
l−1∑
i=0
exp
{
−γ
2[ξˆm+ (i− 1)γξˆm]
6(1 + γ)
}
using the bounds on tl1m and [tli+1 − tli ]m
≤
2 exp{− γ2ξˆm6(1+γ)}
1− exp{− γ3ξˆm6(1+γ)}
≤ 3 exp
{
− γ
2ξˆm
6(1 + γ)
}
if exp
{
− γ
3ξˆm
6(1 + γ)
}
≤ 1
3
.
We want the failure probability to be at most δ. So we need γ
2ξˆm
6(1+γ) ≥ ln 3δ , i.e. m ≥ 6(1+γ)γ2ξˆ ln
3
δ .
We also need m ≥ 6(1+γ)
γ3ξˆ
ln 3 to satisfy the condition in the final inequality.
6.4 Relating the Actual and the Empirical Virtual Values
Let Ea be the event that the high probability outcome of Lemma 6.2 occurs, namely that for
all v ≤ vbξˆmc, q(v) ∈
[
q¯(v)
(1+ν) , q¯(v)(1 + ν)
]
. Ea occurs with probability at least 1− δ. It will also
be helpful to express the bound on v as a bound on q¯. To this end, we define ξ¯ = t1 =
2ξˆm−1
2m .
We will repeatedly encounter terms of the form ϕ(λq) with λ > 1; For λq > 1, ϕ(λq) is
interpreted to mean ϕ(1); similarly for ϕ¯.
Lemma 6.3. Conditioned on Ea, for all empirical quantiles q¯ ≥ ξ¯, CR(q¯) ≤ q¯ · v( q¯1+ν ), and for
all th =
2j−1
2m ≥ ξ¯, CR(th) ≥ th · v( th(1 + ν)).
This lemma is not as obvious as it may seem for it concerns points on the convex hull CR
of the set of points R that are used to specify the empirical revenue.
Proof. By Lemma 6.2, as Ea holds, for all th ≥ ξ¯,
th · v(th(1 + ν)) ≤ R(th) ≤ th · v( th
1 + ν
).
We define L(q¯) = q¯ · v(q¯(1 + ν)) and U(q¯) = q¯ · v( q¯1+ν ) for all q¯.
Note that for any pair q 6= q′ of quantiles, the line joining the actual revenue R( q1+ν ) =
q
1+ν v(
q
1+ν ) to R(
q′
1+ν ) =
q′
1+ν v(
q′
1+ν ) is parallel to the line joining U(q) to U(q
′), for the latter
line is obtained by expanding the former line by a factor 1 + ν in both the quantile and revenue
dimensions. By the regularity of ϕ, the curve defined by R is convex, and consequently, the
points U(q¯) all lie on their convex hull.
For th ≥ ξ¯, U(th) is an upper bound on R(th); it follows that the convex hull for the
empirical revenue, for q¯ ≥ ξ¯, is enclosed by the convex hull U(q¯), and consequently CR(q¯) ≤
U(q¯) = q¯ · v( q¯1+ν ).
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For the second result, the lower bound, we use a similar argument, but it will apply just
to the empirical quantiles th ≥ ξ¯. Now, for any pair q 6= q′ of quantiles, the line joining the
actual revenue R(q(1 + ν)) = q(1 + ν)v(q(1 + ν)) to R(q′(1 + ν)) = q′(1 + ν) · v(q′(1 + ν)) is
parallel to the line joining L(q) to L(q′), and hence the points L(q¯) all lie on their convex hull.
But, for th ≥ ξ¯, L(th) ≤ R(th), and consequently the values R(th) all lie on or above the curve
L(th).
The following lemma, which lies at the heart of out analysis, shows that with high probabilityϕ(q)
is close to some value ϕ¯(q¯ ′) with q¯ ′ ∈ [ q¯
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
, q¯(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)].
Lemma 6.4. Let F be a regular distribution. Suppose that (1 + ∆) ≥ (1 + ν)2. Let th = 2h−12m ,
for 1 ≤ h ≤ m. Conditioned on Ea, if th−1 < q¯ ≤ th, then
i. for all q¯ with ξ¯(1+∆)(1+ν)3 ≤ q¯, ϕ(q) ≤ ϕ( th
(1+ν)2
) ≤ ϕ¯( q¯
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
)+2 ν∆(1+∆)(1+ν)
3 SR
q¯ ,
and
ii. for all q¯ with ξ¯ ≤ q¯, ϕ¯(q¯(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)) ≤ ϕ(th(1 + ν)) + 2 ν∆ SRq¯ ≤ ϕ(q) + 2 ν∆ SRq¯ .
Proof. The main part of the proof concerns the second inequality in (i) and the first one in (ii).
We begin by proving the inequality in (i). First we give an upper bound on ϕ( th
(1+ν)2
) and a
lower bound on ϕ¯( q¯
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
).
As F is regular, R is convex; thus:
ϕ(
th
(1 + ν)2
) ≤
R( th
(1+ν)2
)−R( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
)
th
(1+ν)2
− th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
=
th
(1+ν)2
· v( th
(1+ν)2
)− th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
v( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4)
)
th
(1+ν)2
− th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
=
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)2v( th
(1+ν)2
)− v( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
)
2ν + ν2 + ∆(1 + ν)2
.
The following bound applies only when th
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
≥ ξ¯ for otherwise CR( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
) is not
defined; the constraint q¯ ≥ ξ¯(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3 suffices.
ϕ¯(
q¯
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3
) ≥
CR( th
(1+ν)3
)− CR( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
)
th
(1+ν)3
− th
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
≥
th
(1+ν)3
· v( th
(1+ν)2
)− th
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
v( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
)
th
(1+ν)3
− th
(1+∆)(1+ν)3
(by Lemma 6.3)
=
(1 + ∆)v( th
(1+ν)2
)− v( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
)
∆
.
Now, we combine the bounds so as to eliminate the term v( th
(1+∆)(1+ν)4
).
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2ν + ν2 + ∆(1 + ν)2
∆
ϕ(
th
(1 + ν)2
)− ϕ¯( q¯
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3
)
≤
(1 + ∆)[(1 + ν)2 − (1 + ∆)]v( th
(1+ν)2
)
∆
≤ (1 + ∆)(2ν + ν
2)
∆
SR(1 + ν)2
th
(as SR ≥ th
(1 + ν)2
v
(
th
(1 + ν)2
)
)
≤ 2 ν
∆
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3
SR
q¯
.
In other words,(
1 +
ν(1 + ∆)(2 + ν)
∆
)
ϕ(
th
(1 + ν)2
)− ϕ¯( q¯
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3
) ≤ 2 ν
∆
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3
SR
q¯
.
Thus
ϕ(
th
(1 + ν)2
) ≤ ϕ¯( q¯
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3
) + 2
ν
∆
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3
SR
q¯
.
The second inequality in (ii) is shown similarly. We start with an upper bound on ϕ¯(q¯(1 +
∆)(1 + ν)) and a lower bound on ϕ(th(1 + ν)). The first bound applies only when th ≥ ξ¯; here
q¯ ≥ ξ¯ suffices.
ϕ¯(q¯(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)) ≤ ϕ¯(th(1 + ∆)) ≤ CR(th(1 + ∆))− CR(th)
(1 + ∆)th − th
≤ th(1 + ∆) · v(
th(1+∆)
1+ν )− thv(th(1 + ν))
∆th
(by Lemma 6.3)
=
(1 + ∆)v( th(1+∆)1+ν )− v(th(1 + ν))
∆
.
ϕ(th(1 + ν)) ≥
R( th(1+∆)(1+ν) )−R(th(1 + ν))
th(1+∆)
(1+ν) − th(1 + ν)
=
th(1+∆)
1+ν v(
th(1+∆)
1+ν )− th(1 + ν)v(th(1 + ν))
th(1+∆)
1+ν − th(1 + ν)
=
(1 + ∆)v( th(1+∆)1+ν )− (1 + ν)2v(th(1 + ν))
∆− 2ν − ν2 .
Again, we combine the bounds so as to eliminate the term v(th(1 + ν)).
ϕ¯(q¯(1 + ∆)(1 + ν))− ∆− 2ν − ν
2
∆(1 + ν)2
ϕ(th(1 + ν))
≤
(1 + ∆)[(∆− 2ν − ν2)− ∆−2ν−ν2
(1+ν)2
]v( th(1+∆)1+ν )
∆(∆− 2ν − ν2)
≤ (1 + ∆)ν(2 + ν)
∆(1 + ν)2
SR(1 + ν)
(1 + ∆)th
(as SR ≥ (1 + ∆)th
1 + ν
v
(
(1 + ∆)th
1 + ν
)
)
≤ 2 ν
∆
SR
q¯
.
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In other words,
ϕ¯(q¯(1 + ∆)(1 + ν))−
(
1− ν(1 + ∆)(2 + ν)
∆(1 + ν)2
)
ϕ(th(1 + ν)) ≤ 2 ν
∆
SR
q¯
.
Thus
ϕ¯(q¯(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)) ≤ ϕ(th(1 + ν)) + 2 ν
∆
SR
q¯
.
We now show the remaining inequalities. To obtain the first inequality in (i), we note that
by Lemma 6.2 and Ea, q ≥ q¯(1+ν) > th(1+ν)2 , from which the result follows. Similarly, for the
second inequality in (ii), th(1 + ν) ≥ q¯(1 + ν) ≥ q, and again the result follows.
6.5 Bounding the Expected Revenue Loss
Finally, we consider an auction with k bidders, where the valuation for the ith bidder comes
from regular distribution Fi. For brevity, bidder i is referred to as i.
We define Eb to be the event that Ea holds for every distribution Fi.
Let Shtf =
∑
iE[ϕi · xi]−
∑
iE[ϕi · x˜i]. In other words, MR + Shtf = MR, so it suffices to
show that Shtf ≤ MR. Recall that qri denotes the quantile of Fi corresponding to the reserve
price for i in the Myerson auction and qr¯i denotes the quantile corresponding to the reserve
price in the empirical auction. Also, we let q¯i be a quantile for i in the empirical auction, and
we let qi denote the corresponding quantile in Fi. q¯j and qj are defined similarly with respect
to j. In addition, to reduce clutter, we let β = (1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3 − 1.
The next lemma provides an upper bound on Shtf as the sum of several terms which we will
bound in turn.
Lemma 6.5. Conditioned on Eb,
Shtf =
∑
i
[∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) · xi(qi) dqi −
∫
qi≤qr¯i
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi
]
≤
∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) · [xi(qi)− x˜i( qi
1 + β
)] dqi (7)
+ β
∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) dqi (8)
+
∑
i
∫
qri≤qi≤qr¯i
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi. (9)
Proof. We upper bound the second (negative) term in the expression for Shtf.
−
∫
qi≤qr¯i
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi = −
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi +
∫
qri≤qi≤qr¯i
[−ϕi(qi)] · x˜i(qi) dqi
≤ −
∫
qi≤qri/(1+β)
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi +
∫
qri≤qi≤qr¯i
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi
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and
−
∫
qi≤qri/(1+β)
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi
= −(1 + β)
∫
qi≤qri/(1+β)
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi + β
∫
qi≤qri/(1+β)
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi
≤ −
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(
qi
1 + β
) · x˜i( qi
1 + β
) dqi + β
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) · x˜i(qi) dqi
≤ −
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) · x˜i( qi
1 + β
) dqi + β
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) dqi.
Substituting in the expression for Shtf yields the result.
The bound on (8) is simply
β
∑
i
SRi = kβ ·MR. (10)
In the following lemmas we bound the terms (9) and (7). To bound (9) we partition the integral
into two intervals. The intervals are the ranges qri ≤ qi ≤ max{ξi, qri} and max{ξi, qri} ≤ qi ≤
qr¯i , respectively, where ξi is the quantile of Fi corresponding to empirical quantile ξ¯.
Lemma 6.6. Conditioned on Eb,∑
i
∫
qri≤qi≤max{ξi,qri}
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi ≤ kξ¯(1 + ν) ·MR.
Proof. If ξi ≤ qri the integral is zero and the result is immediate. So we can assume that
ξi ≥ qri . Note that −ϕi(qi) is a non-decreasing function of qi; thus its smallest values in the
range qi ≥ qri occur in the integral we are seeking to bound. It follows that∫
qri≤qi≤ξi
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi ≤ ξi − qri
1− qri
∫
qri≤qi
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi
≤ ξi
∫
qri≤qi
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi
≤ ξi
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) dqi (as
∫
0≤qi≤1
ϕi(qi) dqi = 0)
= ξi · SRi ≤ ξi ·MR ≤ ξ¯(1 + ν) ·MR.
The last two inequalities follow from Claim 6.1(ii) and Lemma 6.2, respectively. The result
follows on summing over i.
Lemma 6.7. Conditioned on Eb,
E
[∑
i
∫
max{ξi,qri}≤qi≤qr¯i
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi
]
≤ 2ν
∑
i
SRi ≤ 2kν ·MR.
Proof. let χi = max{ξi, qri} and let χi = max{ξ¯, qri} be the corresponding empirical quantile.
Again, if χi ≥ qr¯i the integral is zero and the result is immediate. So we can assume that
χi < qr¯i . The derivation below uses Lemma 6.2 to justify the first and third inequalities; the
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second inequality follows from the definition of ri as the empirical reserve price since χi ≥ ξ¯.
Conditioned on Eb,
qr¯i · ri ≥
q¯r¯i · ri
1 + ν
≥ χi · v¯i(χi)
1 + ν
≥ χi · vi(χi)
(1 + ν)2
. (11)
Thus∫
max{ξi,qri}≤qi≤qr¯i
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi = χi · vi(χi)− qr¯i · ri ≤ χi · vi(χi)
[
1− 1
(1 + ν)2
]
(by (11))
≤ ν(2 + ν)
(1 + ν)2
SRi ≤ 2ν · SRi ≤ 2ν ·MR.
It remains to bound term (7).
Before proceeding to the next lemma we need some additional terminology, namely the
notions of i-safety, and of large and small amounts.
Definition 6.1. The vector of quantiles q = (q1, q2, · · · , qk) is said to be i-safe if q¯h ≥ ξ¯ for all
h 6= i.
We will also write q = (qi, qj , q−ij) and q = (qi, q−i), when we want to focus on just two or
one coordinates of the quantile vector.
We define large and small amounts with respect to ϕi(qi) and ϕj(qj) as follows.
Definition 6.2. Let ρ and ρ′ be defined as in Lemma 6.2. Suppose that ϕi(qi) ≥ ϕj(qj). ϕi(qi)
is said to exceed ϕi(qj) by a large amount in the following cases:
i. For q¯i ≥ ξ¯(1 + β),
ϕi(qi)− ϕi(qj) ≥ 2 ν
∆
(1 + β) · SRi
q¯i
+ 2
ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
,
ii. and for q¯i < ξ¯(1 + β),
ϕi(qi)− ϕi(qj) ≥ 2 ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
.
Otherwise, ϕi(qi) is said to exceed ϕi(qj) by a small amount.
The following lemma bounds the probability that i wins by a large amount over j in the
Myerson auction at quantile q, while j wins in the empirical auction at quantile q/(1 + β).
Lemma 6.8. Conditioned on Eb, for any pair i and j, and for any qi, if q¯j ≥ ξ¯, then the
probability of the following event is bounded by (1 + β)2 − 1:
i wins in the Myerson auction by a large amount over j at quantile q, and j wins
in the empirical auction at quantile q¯/(1 + β), where q = (qi, q−i) is i-safe.
Proof. We begin with the case that q¯i ≥ ξ¯(1 + ∆). Given Eb, by Lemma 6.4, for ξ¯(1 + β) ≤ q¯i,
ϕi(qi) ≤ ϕ¯i( q¯1+β )+2 ν∆(1+β) · SRiq¯i and for ξ¯ ≤ q¯j , ϕ¯j(q¯j(1+∆)(1+ν)) ≤ ϕj(qj)+2 ν∆
SRj
q¯j
. Thus,
ϕ¯j(q¯j(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)) ≤ ϕj(qj) + 2 ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
< ϕi(qi)− 2 ν
∆
(1 + β) · SRi
q¯i
(from Definition 6.2(i))
≤ ϕ¯i( q¯i
1 + β
)
< ϕ¯j(
q¯j
1 + β
).
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Thus we have a lower bound of ϕ¯j(q¯j(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)) and an upper bound of ϕ¯j(
q¯j
1+β ) on the
remaining terms. Clearly these can both hold only for a limited range of q¯j and hence of qj ,
which we bound as follows. Define ˆ¯qj = arg inf q¯j{ϕ¯j(q¯j(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)) ≤ ϕ¯i(q¯i/[1 + β])}. Then
these bounds can hold at most for q¯j satisfying ˆ¯qj ≤ q¯j < ˆ¯qj(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)(1 + β). To obtain a
probability bound, one needs to express the range in terms of the qj quantile, namely ranging
at most from ˆ¯qj/(1 + ν) to min{1, ˆ¯qj(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)2(1 + β)}, i.e. with probability at most
(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)3(1 + β)− 1 = (1 + β)2 − 1.
When q¯i < ξ¯(1 + β), we proceed similarly. (The third inequality below follows because for
q¯i ≤ ξ¯, ϕ¯i(q¯i) = vi(qi), and the fourth inequality holds because q¯i(1+β) ≤ ξ¯ by assumption.)
ϕ¯j(q¯j(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)) ≤ ϕj(qj) + 2 ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
< ϕi(qi)
≤ max {vi(qi), vi(ξi)}
≤ ϕ¯i(min{q¯i, ξ¯})
≤ ϕ¯i( q¯i
1 + β
) < ϕ¯j(
q¯j
1 + β
).
The rest of the argument is as for (i).
Lemma 6.9. Conditioned on Eb,∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) · [xi(qi)− x˜i( qi
1 + β
)] dqi
≤
[
(k − 1)ξ¯(1 + ν) + k(k − 1)[(1 + β)2 − 1] + (ρ+ ρ′) + 4k(1 + β)(1 + ν) ν
∆
· ln 1 + ν
ξ¯
]
MR.
Proof. We let Exi (qi) be the event that quantile q = (qi, q−i) is not i-safe. Clearly Pr[Exi ] ≤∑
j 6=i ξj ≤ (k−1)ξ¯(1+ν). Let xei (qi) be the probability that i wins when the quantile q = (qi, q−i)
is not i-safe. Note that xi(qi |q is not i-safe) ≤ xi(qi), as having some qj be small only increases
the probability that j wins. Thus
xei (qi) ≤ (k − 1)ξ¯(1 + ν)xi(qi). (12)
We let xbi denote the probability that i wins both in Myerson’s auction with i-safe q =
(qi, q−i) and in the empirical auction at quantile q/(1 + β).
We also introduce notation to measure the probability of wins by small and large amounts,
for i-safe quantiles. We will be measuring the probability that i wins in the Myerson auction
at quantile q = (qi, qj , q−ij) and j wins in the empirical auction at quantile q/(1 + β), for some
q−ij . xsij(qi, qj) measures the probability of this event in the case that the win in the Myerson
auction is by a small amount, and xlij(qi, qj) measures the probability of the event when the
win margin is large.
Switching perspectives, we let x˜sij(qi, qj) denote the probability that i wins in the empirical
auction at quantile q/(1 + β) and j wins by a small amount over i in the Myerson auction at
quantile q, where q = (qi, qj , q−ij) is j-safe. Clearly, x˜sji(qj , qi) = x
s
ij(qi, qj).
We also note that
xi(qi) = x
e
i (qi) + x
b
i(qi) +
∑
j 6=i
∫
q¯j≥ξ¯
xsij(qi, qj) + x
l
ij(qi, qj) dqj , (13)
and for q¯i ≥ ξ¯,
x˜i(
qi
1 + β
) ≥ xbi(qi) +
∑
i 6=j
∫
q¯j≥0
x˜sij(qi, qj) dqj . (14)
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By Lemma 6.8, ∫
qj≥ξ¯
xlij(qi, qj) ≤ (1 + β)2 − 1. (15)
We obtain:
∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) · [xi(qi)− x˜i( qi
1 + β
)] dqi
≤
∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi)
xbi(qi) + xei (qi) +∑
j 6=i
∫
q¯j≥ξ¯
xsij(qi, qj) + x
l
ij(qi, qj)
 dqj
−
xbi(qi) +∑
j 6=i
∫
q¯j≥ξ¯
x˜sij(qi, qj)
 dqi
 dqi (using (13) and (14))
≤
∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi)
xei (qi) +∑
j 6=i
∫
q¯j≥ξ¯
[xli(qi, qj) + x
s
i (qi, qj)]
 dqi dqj
−
∑
j
∫
qj≤qrj
ϕj(qj) ·
∑
i 6=j
∫
q¯i≥ξ¯
x˜sji(qj , qi) dqj dqi (16)
≤
∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
(k − 1)ξ¯(1 + ν) · ϕi(qi) · xi(qi) dqi + (k − 1)[(1 + β)2 − 1]
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) dqi
(using (12) and (15))
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
[∫
qi≤qri ,q¯j≥ξ¯
ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj) dqi dqj
−
∫
qj≤qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi) dqi dqj
]
≤ (k − 1)ξ¯(1 + ν)
∑
i
MRi + (k − 1)[(1 + β)2 − 1]
∑
i
SRi (17)
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,qj≤qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
[ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj)− ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi)] dqi dqj (18)
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,qj>qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj) dqi dqj . (19)
We bound (17)–(19) in turn.
(k − 1)ξ¯(1 + ν)
∑
i
MRi + (k − 1)[(1 + β)2 − 1]
∑
i
SRi
≤ (k − 1)ξ¯(1 + ν)MR + k(k − 1)[(1 + β)2 − 1]MR. (20)
We can deduce from (13) that∑
j 6=i
∫
q¯j≥ξ¯
xsij(qi, qj) dqj ≤ xi(qi) ≤ 1, (21)
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and from (14), for q¯j ≥ ξ¯,∑
i 6=j
∫
qi≥0
xsij(qi, qj) dqi =
∑
i 6=j
∫
qi≥0
x˜sji(qj , qi) dqi ≤ x˜j(
qj
1 + β
) ≤ 1. (22)
For (18), recall that xsij(qi, qj) = x˜
s
ji(qj , qi). Thus when q¯j ≥ ξ¯j , if q¯i ≥ ξ¯(1 + β), ϕi(qi) ·
xsij(qi, qj) − ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi) ≤ xsij [2 ν∆
SRj
q¯j
+ 2 ν∆(1 + β) · SRiq¯i ], and if q¯i < ξ¯(1 + β), ϕi(qi) ·
xsij(qi, qj) − ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi) ≤ xsij [2 ν∆
SRj
q¯j
]. Equivalently, if q¯i ≥ ξ¯(1 + β), ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj) −
ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi) ≤
xsij(qi,qj)
1+ρ′ [2
ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
+ 2 ν∆(1 + β) · SRiq¯i ], and if q¯i < ξ¯(1 + β), ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj)−
ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi) ≤
xsij(qi,qj)
1+ρ′ [2
ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
]. Thus
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,qj≤qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
[ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj)− ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi)] dqi dqj
≤
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,q¯i≥ξ¯(1+β),qj≤qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
xsij(qi, qj)
1 + ρ′
·
[
2
ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
+ 2
ν
∆
(1 + β) · SRi
q¯i
]
dqi dqj
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,q¯i<ξ¯(1+β),qj≤qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
xsij(qi, qj)
1 + ρ′
· 2 ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
dqi dqj
≤
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,qi≥ 1+β1+ν ξ¯,qj≤qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
2
ν
∆
(1 + β)(1 + ν) · SRi
qi
· xsij(qi, qj) dqi dqj
+
∑
j
∫
qrj≥qj≥ ξ¯1+ν
2
ν
∆
SRj(1 + ν)
qj
dqj (using (22)). (23)
For (19), we note that as qj > qrj , ϕj(qj) ≤ 0, and then when there is a small margin win
by i, by definition, if ξ¯(1 + β) ≤ q¯i, ϕi(qi) ≤ 2 ν∆
SRj
q¯j
+ 2 ν∆(1 + β)
SRi
q¯i
, and if ξ¯(1 + β) > q¯i,
ϕi(qi) < 2
ν
∆
SRj
q¯j
. Also, the constraint q¯j ≥ ξ¯ implies qj ≥ ξ¯(1+ν) . Thus∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,qj>qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj) dqi dqj
≤
∑
j
∫
qj>max{qrj , ξ¯1+ν }
2
ν
∆
(1 + ν)
SRj
qj
dqj (using (22))
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qj≥qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯,q¯i≥ξ¯(1+β)
2
ν
∆
(1 + β)(1 + ν)
SRi
qi
· xsij(qi, qj) dqi dqj (24)
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Combining (23) and (24) yields∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,qj≤qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
[ϕi(qi) · xsij(qi, qj)− ϕj(qj) · x˜sji(qj , qi)] dqi dqj
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
∫
qi≤qri ,qj>qrj ,q¯j≥ξ¯
ϕi(qi)x
s
ij(qi, qj) dqi dqj
≤
∑
j
∫
qj≥ ξ¯1+ν
2
ν
∆
(1 + ν)
SRj
qj
dqj
+
∑
i
∫
qi≥ξ¯ (1+β)1+ν
2
ν
∆
(1 + β)(1 + ν)
SRi
qi
dqi (using (21))
≤
∑
i
(ρ+ ρ′)MRi +
∑
j
2
ν
∆
(1 + β)(1 + ν)SRi ln
(1 + ν)
ξ¯(1 + β)
+
∑
i
2
ν
∆
SRj(1 + ν) ln
1 + ν
ξ¯
≤ 4k ν
∆
(1 + β)(1 + ν) ln
1 + ν
ξ¯
MR. (25)
We are now ready to bound Shtf.
Lemma 6.10.
Shtf ≤ MR [kδ + k2δ + kβ + kξ¯(1 + ν) + 2kν + (k − 1)ξ¯(1 + ν) + k(k − 1)[(1 + β)2 − 1]]
+ MR
[
4k(1 + β)(1 + ν)
ν
∆
· ln 1 + ν
ξ¯
]
.
Proof. In the event that Ea does not hold for some Fi, which occurs with probability at most
kδ, the contribution to Shtf is at most
kδ
[∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi)xi(qi) dqi −
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi)x˜i(qi) dqi
]
≤ kδMR + kδ
∑
i
∫
qri<qi≤qri
[−ϕi(qi)] dqi
≤ kδMR + kδ
∑
i
∫
qi≤qri
ϕi(qi) dqi (as
∫
qi
ϕi(qi) dqi = 0)
≤ kδMR + kδ
∑
i
SRi ≤ kδMR + k2δMR.
Otherwise, the contribution is given by summing the bounds from (10), Lemmas 6.6–6.7,
and 6.9.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We first choose ∆, ν, ξ¯ ≤ 112 . It is easy to check that then (1+β)2−1 =
(1 + ∆)2(1 + ν)6 − 1 ≤ 2∆(1 + ∆)(1 + ν)6 + 6ν(1 + ∆)2(1 + ν)5 ≤ (2∆ + 6ν) (1312)7 ≤ 4∆ + 11ν.
Similarly, β ≤ 2∆ + 4ν, and 4(1 + β)(1 + ν) ≤ 4 (1312)5 ≤ 4 · 32 = 6. Consequently,
Shtf ≤ MR
[
kδ + k2δ + 2k∆ + 4kν + 3kξ¯ + 2kν + 4k(k − 1)∆ + 11k(k − 1)ν + 6k ν
∆
ln
(1 + ν)2
ξ¯
]
.
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It suffices that Shtf ≤ MR. To this end, we bound the right hand side of the above expression
by . To achieve this it suffices to choose ν, ξ¯, δ, and ∆ as follows:
k(k + 1)δ =
1
4

(4k(k − 1) + 2k)∆ = 1
4

3kξ¯ =
1
4

4kν + 2kν + 11k(k − 1)ν + 6k ν
∆
ln
(1 + ν)2
ξ¯
=
1
4
.
It suffices that
δ = Θ
( 
k2
)
∆ = Θ
( 
k2
)
ξ¯ = Θ
( 
k
)
ν = Θ
(
2
k3
1
ln k
)
.
One final detail is that we need to set ξˆ also, but it suffices to note that ξˆ = ξ¯ + 12m and so
ξˆ = Θ( k ) +
1
2m .
By Lemma 6.2, m = Ω( 1
γ3ξˆ
+ln 1δ · 1γ2ξˆ ) suffices. Recalling that 1+ν = (1+γ)
2, so γ = Θ(ν),
we obtain that m = Ω(k
10
7
ln3 k ) suffices.
7 Conclusions
This paper proposes a general model for learning a near-optimal auction from data, in the form
of i.i.d. samples from unknown distributions. It provides upper and lower bounds on the sample
complexity for the case of single-item auctions, and shows that the number of samples required
to obtain a (1 − )-approximation of the optimal expected revenue scales polynomially with
both the number k of bidders and with 1 . We conclude by listing some of the many directions
in which this work could be extended.
1. Prove tight bounds (in terms of k and 1 ) on how many samples are necessary and sufficient
to achieve expected revenue at least 1−  times the maximum possible. (See [28, 32, 16]
for recent progress.)
2. Prove good sample complexity upper bounds for settings other than single-item auctions.
(See [32] for recent progress.)
3. Are there natural settings where the learning problem is information-theoretically easy
(meaning polynomial sample complexity) yet computationally hard (under complexity
assumptions)?
4. Identify multi-parameter problems, less general than those in [19], where a near-optimal
mechanism can be learned from a polynomial number of samples.
29
5. For problems where a (1 − )-approximate mechanism cannot be learned from a poly-
nomial number of samples, identify the best-possible approximation factor for which an
approximately optimal mechanism can be efficiently learned.
6. If some of the bidders that contribute the samples are the same as the bidders that
participate in the final auction, then these bidders need not bid truthfully. (Underbidding
could result in lower payments in the future.) Is it still possible to learn a near-optimal
auction in this setting?
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